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Abstract 
We analyze the importance of legitimacy and compare how drivers of public policy attitudes evolve 
across the policy process consisting of the input (i.e. the processes forgoing acquisition of power and 
the procedures permeating political decision-making), throughput (i.e. the inclusion of and interactions 
between actors in a governance-system) and output (i.e. the substantive consequences of those 
decisions) stages. Using unique panel data through the three phases of the congestion tax in the 
Swedish city of Gothenburg, we find that legitimacy is indeed important in explaining policy support.  
Moreover, we find a lingering effect where support in one phase depends on legitimacy both in the 
present and in previous phases. Hence, our study takes us one step further on the road to understand 
the complicated dynamic mechanisms behind the interactions between policy making, policy support 
and the legitimacy and approval of politicians and political processes.  
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1. Introduction 
How might we explain the mechanisms driving citizens to, in some cases, support the 
introduction of policy measures they initially reject? In this paper, we suggest that post-
implementation changes in policy attitudes are the result of a process that unfolds 
throughout the whole policy cycle, from initial proposal to final implementation. 
Furthermore, we theorize that the perceived legitimacy, i.e., whether the policy arises 
from the rightful source and process of authoritative decision-making and whether its 
content pertains to a normatively justifiable interest of a policy (cf. Beetham 1991; 
Matti 2010), affect public support differently across the input, throughput, and output 
stages of the policy process. Certainly, we acknowledge that the policy cycle should be 
viewed an incremental (cf. Lindblom 1959) or dynamic process. That is, a process 
incorporating a range of spatially and temporally interconnected processes, ideas, actors 
and actions (e.g. Hall & McGinty 1997; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999), rather than a 
linear progression through a set of separated and functionally sequenced stages. 
However, we here refer to a process of introducing a specific policy measure as being a 
more sequential subset of this cycle, where real-time political events (i.e. formal 
decision-making, implementation of a measure, or evaluations through referendums) 
mark the critical junctures of transition from one stage to another.   
In all societies it is unavoidable that politicians from time to time decide upon 
and eventually implement policies that lack support among parts of the citizenry. 
However, in many instances, initial negative public attitudes gradually alleviate or even 
transform into broadened public acceptance and support as the public experiences, and 
thus responds to, different aspects of the policy (Naurin 2010; Page and Shapiro 1983). 
Empirical evidence is found in relation to numerous major policy decisions ranging 
from, e.g., the Swedish decision to revert to right-hand traffic in 1967 (which only about 
15% of the voters supported in the preceding referendum), across the rather recent 
introductions of smoking bans in most major cities around the world, to the 
implementation of single policy measures such as the congestion pricing mechanisms in 
London (Transport for London 2004) and Milan (Rotaris et al. 2010). These 
observations of gradually stronger public support post-implementation are in line with 
established theoretical models of policy feedback loops, where a policy simultaneously 
is treated both as an outcome of political processes, as well as an independent variable 
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influencing public policy attitudes and thus constituting new inputs to the political 
system (Mettler and Soss 2004; Schattschneider 1935; Skocpol 1992). 
Although the public policy-public opinion nexus is rather well researched, seen 
from Easton’s systems perspective (e.g., Easton 1953), i.e., where policy outcomes 
affect both the incentives and the resources of the mass public (cf. Pierson 1993; Soss 
1999; Svallfors 2010), significantly fewer studies theorize and scrutinize the internal 
dynamics of the policy cycle and the mechanisms that drive changes in public policy 
attitudes across different stages of the policy process. To better grasp how the feedback 
effects actually play out between citizens and policy makers, such an approach is key. 
In order to test our theoretical predictions, we make use of a unique panel data 
set, allowing for a systematic comparison of public policy attitudes and their 
antecedents, across the whole process of deciding upon and implementing a congestion 
tax in the Swedish city of Gothenburg. In the next section, we first set the theoretical 
scene, after which we model this policy process and derive four hypotheses for 
empirical testing. In section 3, we account for our methods, measurements, and 
descriptive statistics of the data. In section 4, we present our results, which is followed 
by a discussion and concluding section. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses: The Mechanisms of Policy Support 
To grasp the dynamics of policy support as the policy process moves across the stages 
in a policy cycle, it is essential to consider if and how the mechanisms and factors likely 
to affect support change over time. Taking up this gauntlet, we start from the 
proposition that the antecedents of policy support stem from the perceived legitimacy of 
the policy. Accordingly, if perceptions of legitimacy, and what legitimacy entails, 
change throughout the process being studied, this should subsequently be manifested 
through corresponding changes in public policy support. The main reason for us 
focusing on policy support, rather than acceptance or consent, as the manifestation of 
legitimacy is to distinguish between a values-based justifiability of decisions or 
expected outcomes (i.e. legitimacy), and more volatile and passively held policy 
opinions. Whereas public support can be viewed as an active display of encouragement 
to implement or sustain a policy perceived as morally rightful, defining legitimacy as 
acquiescence may lead to false conclusions. In particular, acceptance or consent is not 
necessarily driven by policy legitimacy, but may as well be a result of public 
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indifference or apathy (cf. Schaar 1984; Beetham 1990; Føllesdal 2004; Tsakatika 
2005).   
 
2.1 Legitimacy 
Indisputably, legitimacy is one of the foundational concepts in most of the social and 
political sciences, although rarely associated with the support or compliance on the 
specific policy level. Most commonly, it has an intimate relationship with political 
power and authority and is frequently treated as an independent, explanatory factor 
behind phenomena such as regime performance and as a necessary trait for actors, e.g., 
states, international regimes, and political institutions, who aspire to avoid being ousted 
through elections or revolutions (Beetham 1991; George 1980; Smoke 1994). 
Elsewhere, legitimacy is seen as a prerequisite for political authority, creating the right 
for the Government to expect obedience from its citizens when exercising its power 
(Buchanan 2002; 2003), therefore determining the costs associated with monitoring and 
enforcing public compliance (Beetham 1991; Birch 2001; Parkinson 2003; Stoker 
1998).1 In this category we also find a broad range of research occupied with the 
performance of new, primarily subnational, governance regimes, confirming the 
suggested connection between high levels of political legitimacy and correspondingly 
higher levels of support and voluntary compliance with political decisions (cf. Black 
2008; Ostrom 2005; Stern 2008; Tyler 1990). 
 
2.2. Input, Throughput, and Output Legitimacy 
Several sources to legitimacy are acknowledged in the literature. Broadly following 
Scharpf’s (1999) Lincolnesque distinction between “government by the people” and 
“government for the people” (cf. Hodson and Maher 2002; Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; 
Skogstad 2003), these sources either refer to legitimacy as being founded in the 
processes forgoing the acquisition of power and the procedures permeating political 
decision-making (input legitimacy), or as connected to the consequences of those 
decisions (output legitimacy). 
Thus, focusing on the input side assists us in identifying the structural problems 
facing contemporary political institutions, for instance, the well-researched democratic 
deficit of the European Union, or in targeting elements of representative democracy 
                                                     
1 As captured by Eckstein (1971, 53), “It is hard to think of any goal that is likely to be attained effectively if 
illegitimacy is great, and certainly none that could be as effectively attained with low as with high legitimacy.” 
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such as decision-making accountability and control through elections (e.g., Føllesdal 
and Hix 2006). However, considering output2 legitimacy may also be crucial, especially 
in the study of a specific policy or policy tool, as it contributes to our understanding of 
the public’s longer-term reactions and responses to these policies (Finger and Finon 
2011; Scharpf 1999; Wolf 2002). Thus, for output legitimacy to be generated, decisions 
need to conform to the public’s expectations and work for the benefit of the public. 
Mainly in studies concerned with new governance systems (i.e., where traditional 
logic of hierarchical government are challenged by the inclusion of a multitude of 
stakeholders, often spanning multiple levels of governance), it has been recognized that 
merely focusing on legitimacy as a characteristic of input or an output is insufficient if 
we are to fully understand how legitimacy impacts the public’s policy support 
(Doberstein and Millar 2015; Schmidt 2013). To comprehensively explain why some 
new governance systems perform better than others, some scholars therefore propose 
also analyzing throughput legitimacy, as distinct from traditional representation (input) 
or performance (output). The throughput dimension of legitimacy is significantly less 
theorized (Schmidt 2013) and is typically conflated to be merely an aspect of input 
legitimacy (Bäckstrand 2006; Scharpf 1999). However, examining political decision-
making and implementation by treating throughput as a separate aspect of legitimacy 
allows for a specific focus on the quality of inclusion, interaction, and procedures that 
can nuance the legitimacy-inducing aspects of the decision-making process, particularly 
in multilevel governance structures.3 
 
2.3. Policy Legitimacy 
Despite the growing interest and the assumed relevance of legitimacy for explaining 
regime performance, legitimacy has yet to become a prominent point of departure for 
explicit studies on public policy and specific policy measures. For the most part, public 
policies are viewed as products emerging from a political system. Subsequently, a 
                                                     
2 In this article, we define policy outputs as the direct, short-term results of the policy process, i.e. the introduction of 
the policy measure itself. In the case of the Gothenburg congestion-tax, an up and running pricing mechanism for 
traffic is therefore defined as the output. In contrast, we define policy outcomes as related to the long-term goals of 
the policy process, such as reduced traffic, better air quality, lowered noise pollution, and less CO2-emissions. 
Certainly, when people express their level of support for a policy measure, they most likely take into account the 
expected or experienced outcome of this decision. However, as we do not aspire to measure peoples support for 
possible outcomes (e.g. their support for reducing congestions) but for the policy measure itself, we therefore focus 
on output legitimacy as the last type. 
3 It is thus intimately linked to the inclusion of deliberative practices and broadened participation where “all those 
subject to the decision in question” (Dryzek 2001, 651) also are allowed to participate and deliberate throughout fair, 
open, inclusive, and transparent governance processes. 
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policy’s legitimacy is mainly seen as dependent on the legitimacy of a broader political 
system. As Wallner (2008) concludes (see also Gormley 2007; Smoke 1994), the 
majority of empirical research in the field of policy studies tend to be concerned with 
evaluating the effectiveness or efficiency of policies or political programs by 
considering technical-administrative factors such as problem definition, selection of 
policy tools, access to resources, or the performance of the actors involved in the policy 
implementation process. This means that hitherto studies on specific policies and policy 
instruments, with a few notable exceptions (cf. Citrin and Muste 1999; Montpetit 2008; 
Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann 2007; Wallner 2009), have systematically 
disregarded the proposition that the legitimacy for a single policy might also be a highly 
significant component affecting its overall performance (Mehrtens 2004; Skocpol 1997; 
Williams and Edy 1999). Thus, following Peters (2005), legitimacy is not only a matter 
to be associated with macro-level politics, such as regime stability or performance. 
Rather, it is equally significant at every level of politics, including micro-level 
decisions, such as the implementation and use of specific policy instruments. In these 
cases, it seems reasonable to assume that not only the substantive outputs of a policy, 
but also the processes and procedures prevalent throughout the policy cycle, affect 
perceptions of the policy’s legitimacy, and subsequently, whether or not the policy is 
supported. 
On the policy level, therefore, distinguishing between input, throughput, and 
output allows for analyzing how the sources of legitimacy, and thus the drivers of public 
policy support, vary as the process moves forward through the policy cycle: from initial 
decision-making (input), across implementation (throughput), to the general public’s 
evaluation of policy outputs. By the same token, as political legitimacy can generate 
public support for an authority and, in the longer term, also a propensity among the 
public to subordinate to that authority, we propose that policy legitimacy can serve a 
similar function as a driver behind policy support. 
The conceptualization of legitimacy as stemming from different sources during 
the input, throughput, and output phases, respectively, implies that the legitimization of 
authority should be viewed as dynamic. Initially it spans the procedures determining the 
gaining and exercise of power as well as the expected output. Thereafter it primarily 
involves the processes of implementation, and finally, it concerns the evaluation of 
actual consequences or outputs of decisions being made. On the policy level, this 
suggests that a policy should not be considered a finished project once a formal political 
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decision has been made, but rather as being caught in a constant process of 
development, making it increasingly difficult to isolate decision-making from 
implementation, and output from process (Easton 1953; Friedrich 1940; Kingdon 1995; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). We illustrate this line of reasoning in figure 1, 
where we suggest that factors associated with input legitimacy determine the level of 
pre-implementation public policy support, factors associated with throughput legitimacy 
determine the level of support during the implementation phase, and output legitimacy 
factors affect the level of post-implementation support. 
 
Figure 1. Types of Legitimacy and Their Position in Relation to the Stages of the Policy 
Process 
 
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the synchronous relationship between the phases constituting a policy process, 
i.e., the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policy, and the different forms of legitimacy 
(input, throughput, and output). As the two arrows suggest, the output of, and public reaction to, one 
policy decision sets the agenda for future policy formulation thus creating a cyclical motion over time. 
 
2.4. Modeling the Policy Process 
In this section we sketch a simple model that illustrates our theoretical reasoning that 
goes through the three steps of the policy process in accordance with figure 1. We think 
of a timeline, where t = 1 indicates the input phase, t = 2 the throughput phase, and t = 3 
the output phase. In t = 1, we focus on input legitimacy, i.e., the procedures concerning 
both acquisition of power and decision-making and the trust in policy makers’ ability to 
make high-quality decisions. According to Norris (2011), approval of incumbent office 
holders and agreement with core principles and normative values are important in 
determining legitimacy at this stage. Hence, we can express input legitimacy, 𝐿𝐿1, as the 
positive function 
 
𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴1),     (1) 
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where 𝐴𝐴1 measures the approval and agreement of the procedures and of the decision-
makers in the initial phase. 
In order to explain policy support in this initial phase, we add to the perceived 
legitimacy of the political process the effect of expected policy outcomes. To account 
for expected outcomes we include both consequences for the individual in terms of 
perceived changes in costs and benefits (e.g., Frey 1997; Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz 
1995; Schuitema, Steg, and Forward 2010,) and for the collective in terms of the 
policy’s ability to reach collective goals (e.g., Jagers and Hammar 2009; Kallbekken 
and Sælen 2011; Lubell, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2007). Policy support for the individual i, 
in the input phase thus depends on the expected utility following the policy:  
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖[𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝐺𝐺, 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)],     (2) 
 
where E indicates the expectations operator. Ci is the individual’s private consumption 
and G is the (positive) effect generated by the policy. Expected utility of the policy is 
also affected by how legitimate the process is perceived for the time being. That is, for 
given levels of Ci and G, the individual experiences a higher level of well being if the 
policy is perceived to be legitimate than when policy making is done illegitimately. 
Hence, support in the initial input phase, 𝑌𝑌1, depends positively on the expected 
outcomes Ci and G, as well as on 𝐿𝐿1:  
 
𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑦𝑦(𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺),𝐿𝐿1),                  𝑌𝑌1 ∈ (−∞,∞),   (3) 
 
where Y1 > 0 implies approval of the policy and Y1 < 0 implies objection toward it. 
In the two subsequent phases, the decision has already been made and the 
decision-makers are evaluated by the citizens who compare the decision and policy with 
their personal attitudes. The change in approval, A, from one phase to another can be 
described as 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑎𝑎(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡),    ∀𝑡𝑡 > 1    (4) 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = �𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 > 1        if  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 < 01                   otherwise                                          
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𝑎𝑎 is a positive function, implying that the stronger the policy support in the previous 
phase, the more one will approve of the politicians who made the decision or 
implemented it (depending on the phase) in a similar vein as retrospective voting 
(Fiorina 1981). The inclusion of D suggests that due to disappointment aversion, the 
marginal effect on approval would be stronger for those who objected to the decided 
policy than for those who approved of it (see e.g., Gul 1991). We also let this effect 
vary across phases, as the disappointment may be more decisive in some phases than in 
others. 
When it comes to legitimacy in the throughput and output phases, it would still be 
affected by approval (like in (1)) and the change in legitimacy is expressed as a 
consequence of altered approval in the following way: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑙𝑙[(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡],     (5) 
 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = �𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 > 1        if  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 < 01                   otherwise                                         
 
Just as the change in approval between the phases could be affected by 
disappointment, it is likely that a reduction of legitimacy following reduced approval is 
stronger than the increase following an approval increase of the same magnitude. 
Legitimacy in phase t could thus be expressed as the sum of input legitimacy from 
(1) and the changes in (5). However, to allow for persistence in preferences, we let the 
effective legitimacy in phase t = 2 and t = 3, 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡, be 
 
𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 − 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘−1)𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=2     (6) 
𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 ∈ [0, 1]. 
 
Hence, we could express effective legitimacy in the throughput and output phases 
as 
 L�2 = L1 + γ2(L2 − L1) = (1 − γ2)L1 + γ2L2 L�3 =  L1 + γ2(L2 − L1) + γ3(L3 − L2) = (1 − γ2)L1 + (γ2 − γ3)L2 + γ3L3. 
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No persistence against the policy would imply that γ2 = γ3 = 1, i.e., only present 
legitimacy explains effective legitimacy in a certain phase. No change of legitimacy 
over the policy process, or even the full policy cycle, would instead imply that γ2 =
γ3 = 0. 
Policy support in later phases follows the same structure as the one in the input 
phase, shown in (3), where the relevant legitimacy measure is the effective one, L�t, 
determined in (6): 
 Yt = y(Et(Ci ), Et(G), L�t),                  Yt ∈ (−∞,∞),     t=1, 2, 3  (7) 
 
Depending on the phase, the measures of Ci and G are either expected values or 
actual values based on the individual’s own experience after implementation. Note that L�t in phase t > 1 may also depend on legitimacy perceived in previous phases, 
depending on the values of γ2 and γ3. Hence, policy support in, e.g., the throughput 
phase becomes a function of both input and throughput legitimacy. 
This exposure has shown how legitimacy and policy support may evolve over the 
policy process and the possible links between the different measures in the three phases. 
Initial approval of policy makers may have long-lasting effects since it affects input 
legitimacy, which together with expected policy outcomes determines support in the 
input phase where policy is being formulated. This support is, in turn, important for 
how the policy makers are judged once they make the decision. If the decision goes 
against the general opinion, approval is reduced and legitimacy is likely to fall. This 
change in legitimacy will possibly affect support into the next period (unless γ2 = γ3 =0) and so on. Next, we will apply this model to a specific policy process and test it with 
unique panel data. 
 
2.5. Hypotheses 
With guidance from the model above, we can formulate a set of hypotheses that will be 
tested empirically in section 4. We apply the model to the decision and implementation 
of a congestion tax in Sweden’s second largest city, Gothenburg. We will analyze both 
policy support (what people think of the tax itself) and legitimacy in a policy process 
consisting of three phases (as measured by how the decision and implementation 
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processes were perceived). Our theoretical model allows us to formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Legitimacy is a driver of policy support in all phases of the policy process. 
H2: The sources of legitimacy vary across the different phases of the policy 
process.  
Concerning legitimacy, equation (6) opens up different possibilities. H2 tests whether 
γ2 = γ3 = 0 (i.e., whether there are changes in the sources of legitimacy) or rather:  γt > 0, t = 2, 3 (i.e., whether effective legitimacy changes over time). According to (5) 
we should look for changes in legitimacy as a consequence of altered approval as we 
proceed across the policy process. Moreover, (7) indicates that there is an 
interconnected relationship between legitimacy and policy support at the input, 
throughput, and output phases, respectively (i.e., γt ∈ (0, 1), t = 2, 3). Thus, 
H3: Public policy support in one phase of the policy cycle is a function of 
legitimacy in both the present and the previous phase(s) of the policy cycle. 
Once we have established that legitimacy in previous phases also matters, we can 
finally hypothesize the relative strength by γt > γt−12 , t = 2, 3, that is, 
H4: If H3 holds, legitimacy in the present phase has stronger explanatory power of 
present policy support than legitimacy in previous phases has. 
 
3. Method, Measurements, and Descriptive Statistics of Data 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field experiment constituted by the introduction 
of a congestion tax in Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden. A congestion 
pricing mechanism (CPM) is a policy tool aimed at charging the users of certain goods 
and services for the negative externalities generated by the peak demand in excess of 
available supply. At a price of zero, demand exceeds supply, causing a shortage that is 
corrected by charging the equilibrium price rather than bringing demand down by 
increasing the supply. This pricing mechanism has been used in several public utilities 
and public services for setting higher prices during congested periods as a means to 
better manage the demand for the service and to avoid expensive new investments just 
to satisfy peak demand, or because it is not economically or financially feasible to 
provide additional capacity to the service. The Gothenburg congestion tax (Swedish: 
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Trängselskatt i Göteborg) is a CPM implemented as a tax levied on most vehicles 
entering and exiting central Gothenburg, including some main roads passing by the city. 
The congestion tax was introduced on January 1, 2013, primarily to reduce traffic and 
improve the environmental situation in central Gothenburg, as well as to help financing 
a number of large road and rail construction projects in and around Gothenburg 
(Transportstyrelsen 2016). In figure 2, we illustrate the timing of the data collection in 
relation to key events during the congestion tax policy process. 
 
Figure 2. Key Events and Timing of Data Collection for the Gothenburg Congestion 
Tax 
 
 
 
The data was collected through a panel survey across seven waves, from May 
2012 to October 2014. Enabling a test of changes in public attitudes as the tax 
implementation was nearing, the first wave of data collection took place seven months 
before the Gothenburg congestion tax was implemented, followed by a second wave in 
December 2012, three weeks before the implementation of the congestion tax, in 
January 2013. Approximately five months after the tax implementation, in May 2013, a 
third wave of data collection was conducted in order to measure differences in public 
attitudes before and after the implementation. Data collection encompassing fewer 
observations and questions, along with a significant drop in response rate, continued in 
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November 2013, June 2014, and September 2014, just before a referendum on the tax. 
The last wave was carried out in October 2014, just after the referendum. Here, we 
make use of three waves clearly distinct in time and corresponding to the input, 
throughput, and output phases of the policy process: May 2012 (wave 1), May 2013 
(wave 3), and September 2014 (wave 6). 
Before the first wave of data collection, we recruited 7,888 potential participants 
from two sources. Primarily, participants were recruited through a pop-up ad on the 
website of the main local daily newspaper in the Gothenburg region (Göteborgs-Posten) 
reaching out to more than 400,000 readers (year 2013), which yielded 4,998 participants 
who registered their e-mail addresses for the panel study. In addition, a second 
supplementary participant recruitment method was used, consisting of a large-scale 
mailed invitation to a random sample from the Swedish population register, and it 
resulted in an additional 2,890 participants who registered their e-mail addresses for the 
panel study. The second additional recruitment round was undertaken in order to ensure 
more variation in the sample. Further, this second sample consisted of two strata in 
order to include a sufficient number of people living inside the planned toll zones, 
which was expected to be an influential factor on public attitudes toward congestion 
taxes (Eliasson 2009). Residential area had to be a selection criterion because the share 
of people living inside the planned toll zone in the entire Gothenburg region is very 
small, approximately 8%. 
Of the 7,888 people who registered their e-mail address in the panel, 70% (N = 
5,521) responded to the first panel wave, about 65% (N = 5,127) to the second wave, 
and 60% (N = 4,732) to the third wave. In the last wave we use for our analysis—the 
sixth wave in September 2014—we have 1,422 respondents, but some of them were 
recruited in later phases. This implies that this study has a within-subjects design with 
980 respondents participating in all three waves that we make use of in the regressions. 
The socioeconomic characteristics for the whole sample, as well as for our subsample, 
are displayed in table 1. 
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Table 1. Socioeconomic Characteristics 
 
May 2012 
May 
2013 
Sept. 
2014 
Subsample 
Female 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 
Education (1 = 9+ years, 7 = graduate 
studies) 
5.0 5.1 5.2 5.0 
Age  (2013) 48 48 49 50 
Subjective income (1=very bad, 5=very 
good) 
4.02 4.03 4.02 4.01 
Gothenburg resident 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.63 
Number of obs. 5,512 4,399 1,399 980 
 
 
Our sample is not perfectly representative of the population as it consists of 
more educated, older, and male respondents than the general population. In all 
regressions, we therefore controlled for gender, education, age, and subjective income. 
Furthermore, in the sample a majority of the respondents were residing in Gothenburg, 
whereas most of the remaining respondents resided in nearby municipalities. 
Our policy support variable was captured by a single item repeated across the 
waves, where respondents were asked, “What is your general opinion about the 
congestion tax in Gothenburg?” The response alternatives ranged from 1 (very negative) 
to 7 (very positive). Hence, 4 indicated neutrality (neither positive nor negative). Table 
2a shows how this dependent variable changes over time, across three waves of data-
collection, in the input phase (May 2012), throughput phase (May 2013), and output 
phase (September 2014). The first three columns display the figures for the total 
samples in the three waves, while the last three columns contain the subsample data—
those who participated in all three phases and who we consider as proxies for the input, 
throughput, and output phases, respectively. Consistent with previous studies on policy 
support, support for the congestion tax increased with experience, as the respondents 
became less negative post-implementation. However, 21 months after the 
implementation, a majority of respondents still displayed negative attitudes. This was 
also evident when asked for the dichotomous choice, whether one is generally for or 
against the tax, as displayed in the second row of table 2a. In table 2b we included all 
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steps and the sample was reduced further. From here it becomes apparent that the major 
changes occur after the implementation (January 2013) and just before the referendum 
(September 2014), when support increases significantly. 
 
Table 2a. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax 
 Total Subsample  
 May 
2012 
May 2013 
Sept. 
2014 
May 
2012 
May 2013 
Sept. 
2014 
Total mean (7 
steps) 
2.62 3.06*** 3.39*** 2.74 3.05*** 3.25*** 
Share against 72.9% 64.4%*** 56.5%*** 69.0% 61.3%*** 56.9%*** 
Number of obs. 5,493 4,703 1,422 980 980 980 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% 
level according to t-tests. 
 
 
Table 2b. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax in all Seven Waves among Those 
Remaining in the Panel throughout the Whole Period 
 May 
2012 
Dec. 
2012 
May 
2013 
Nov. 
2013 
June 
2014 
Sept. 
2014 
Oct. 
2014 
Total mean (7 
steps) 
2.74 2.70 3.05*** 3.13 3.10 3.25*** 
3.26 
Number of obs. 874 874 874 874 874 874 874 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in waves 1 and 2 at the 1% 
level according to t-tests. 
 
The total distribution of responses indicates that the most reluctant 
respondents, i.e., those who answered that they are very negative to the congestion tax 
(response alternative 1), account for the major change as their share decreased from 
about 48% in the first wave to 38% in the second and to 33% in the third.4 
                                                     
4 Statistics are available on request. 
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Although the congestion tax was implemented in Gothenburg, it naturally 
affects everyone driving into and out of the city. Apparent from table 4, a majority of 
our sample resided in Gothenburg, though not necessarily within the tolls, and the share 
is fairly stable across the waves. In all waves, those residing in Gothenburg are 
significantly less negative to the congestion tax than are those living outside of 
Gothenburg. 
 
Table 3. Attitudes toward the Congestion Tax by City of Residence (total sample) 
 May 2012 May 2013 Sept. 2014 
 Gothenburg Outside Gothenburg Outside Gothenburg Outside 
Total mean 
(7 steps) 
2.78 2.34*** 3.14 2.83*** 3.52 3.18*** 
Share against 69.2% 79.1%*** 62.5% 69.7%*** 53.9% 62.1%*** 
Share of obs. 63% 37% 63% 37% 64% 36% 
Note: *** indicates that those residing in and outside of Gothenburg have significantly 
different attitudes at the 1% level according to t-tests.  
  
To measure our variable of main interest, legitimacy, we focus on three items, 
where the respondents were asked to indicate how democratic, how open, and how fair 
they perceived the decision-making process to be. Response alternatives ranged from 1 
(not at all democratic/not at all open/highly unfair) to 7 (completely 
democratic/completely open/highly fair) and are presented in table 4. In the last wave, 
only information about the democracy aspect was available, and as the three measures 
are highly correlated, we use this variable as a proxy for legitimacy in our regression 
analyses in section 4. 
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Table 4. Procedural Factors. Mean Values 
  Total   Subsample  
 May 
2012 
May 
2013 
Sept. 
2014 
May 
2012 
May 2013 
Sept. 
2014 
Democratic?  2.38 2.53*** 2.59 2.49 2.57*** 2.50*** 
Open?  2.41 2.36**     
Fair?  2.54 2.60***     
Number of obs. 4,094 4,094 1,418 980 980 980 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% 
level according to t-tests. 
 
Overall, respondents consider the process as neither democratic, nor open or 
fair. Comparing the results before and after implementation, the process was regarded 
significantly more democratic and less unfair after implementation. At the same time, it 
was regarded as significantly less open. 
As pointed out in section 2.4, perceptions of the legitimacy of the political 
process are likely to be affected by the approval of and trust in the institutions 
responsible for it. Here, institutional trust was measured using a set of items on both a 
general level, focusing on trust in national political authority, and more specifically on 
local political institutions. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of trust in 
the Swedish government, the Swedish parliament, the municipal council, the municipal 
executive board, and the municipal public administration. Response alternatives ranged 
from 1 (very high trust) to 5 (very low trust), with 3 labeled as neither high nor low 
trust. Table 5 displays the extent of institutional trust reported by the total sample of 
respondents before and after implementation of the policy. 
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Table 5. Institutional Trust. Mean Values (1 = means high trust, 5 = low trust) 
 May 2012 May 2013 
Trust in central government 2.64     (2.66) 2.6    (2.67) 
Trust in parliament 2.72     (2.72) 2.71    (2.70) 
Trust in municipal government 3.53     (3.68) 3.66***   (3.81***) 
Trust in municipal council 3.51     (3.64) 3.63***   (3.77***) 
Trust in municipal administration 3.44     (3.56) 3.50**     (3.62***) 
Number of obs. 3,790    (2,393) 3,790    (2,393) 
Note: *** indicates significant difference from the mean in the previous wave at the 1% 
level according to t-tests. Results for Gothenburg residents in parentheses. 
 
Between 2012 and 2013, trust in national politicians does not change. However, 
trust in the municipal politicians is significantly lower after the implementation of the 
congestion tax. Respondents residing in Gothenburg are no different from the total 
sample in terms of national institutional trust, but they have significantly lower trust in 
the municipal institutions.5 As might be expected, the correlation between political trust 
on the municipal level and the respondents’ view of the process is rather high. There are 
also strong correlations between political trust on the local level and support for the 
congestion tax, while the corresponding correlations are approximately zero for trust 
toward national politicians. 
Additionally, to gauge the policy version of output legitimacy we also included 
a number of items tapping into the citizens’ expectations and experiences of the policy 
and its consequences. When the policy has been in place for some time, citizens have 
not only experienced the personal effects of the policy but have also received and 
consumed information regarding societal impacts. The respondents were therefore 
asked to indicate the extent of agreement with a number of questions tapping into both 
personal and societal consequences. All items were measured on a 7-point scale and 
displayed in table 6. 
 
                                                     
5 It is not meaningful to make a direct comparison with institutional trust in the output phase, since there was a 
general election held in September 2014 implying that there were different politicians in office at the time of data 
collection. However, in order to reduce problems with multicollinearity we instrumented trust by predicted values, 
which also means that we are able to include trust for the third wave in the regression analysis. 
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Table 6. Personal and Political Outcomes. Mean Values (1 = do not agree, 7 = fully 
agree) 
 May 
2012 
May 
2013 
Sept 
2014 
The congestion tax goes against my values 4.66 4.45***  
I will have it better than before 2.41 2.93*** 2.62*** 
My economic situation will be worse 4.29 4.12*** 3.70*** 
It violates my sense of freedom 4.30 4.08***  
I think it will affect my quality of life negatively 3.98 3.76*** 3.76 
My travel time will be shorter after introduction  2.13 2.93*** 2.42*** 
    
It is a necessary measure 2.72 3.03*** 3.11** 
It is a fair measure 2.70 2.84*** 2.84 
It contributes to protect future generations  2.91 3.13*** 3.10 
It Contributes to protect the environment 2.98 3.17*** 3.12 
It affects primarily those causing the problems 3.09 3.17**  
    
It will be very cumbersome to pay 3.22 2.41***  
How will the tax affect the congestion (1 = diminish, 7 
= increase) 
3.22 3.07*** 3.69*** 
How will the tax affect the pollution (1 = diminish, 7 = 
increase) 
3.32 3.26** 
 
How will the tax affect the noise (1 = diminish, 7 = 
increase) 
3.58 3.55  
 
How will the tax affect the city’s economy (1 = 
diminish, 7 = increase) 
4.18 4.28*** 4.35** 
Number of obs.A 3,580/976 3,580/976 976 
Note: *** and ** indicate a significant difference from the means in the previous wave at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively, according to t-tests. 
A For variables covered in the two first waves only, the sample is 3,580. The sample for questions covered 
in all waves consists of 976 respondents. 
 
19 
 
Like for the attitude toward the tax itself, when it comes to the personal outcome 
expectancies people became significantly less negative after the tax was implemented. 
After implementation, the measures were in terms of experiences rather than 
expectations and it seems that many of the consequences turned out to be less negative 
than expected (most measures were valued significantly more positive in May 2013 
than one year earlier). However, the attitudinal development after implementation was 
not equally uniform. Whereas respondents in September 2014 were more positive 
concerning some aspects (e.g., their own economy and the city’s economy), they clearly 
became more negative about others (e.g., the effect on congestion and their own travel 
time). 
 
4. Results 
In the following, we use regression analysis to establish the relationships between 
legitimacy and policy support. All regressions are run by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and some of the right-hand-side variables are instrumented by predicted value in order 
to reduce problems with multicollinearity.6 
Table 7 shows the raw results where the dependent variable is the support for the 
congestion tax in the input, throughput, and output phases. In model 1, we examine 
support in the input phase, i.e., well in advance of the policy implementation. As an 
explanatory variable, we include input legitimacy as measured by the predicted values 
from the regression that is displayed in the first column in table 8. We also include the 
expectations of some of the personal and political outcomes that were presented in table 
6.7 In the second phase, May 2013, the congestion tax had been in place for almost five 
months. Analyzing the support in model 2, we still control for input legitimacy, but also 
for the potential change in perceived legitimacy between 2012 and 2013. The effect of 
throughput legitimacy could therefore be interpreted as the sum of the coefficients of 
legitimacy in 2012 and the difference. However, people tend to be persistent in their 
views and the support in 2013 could to a large degree be explained by support in 2012. 
Since input legitimacy may affect initial support, the estimate of input legitimacy could 
                                                     
6 Alternatively, one could have used ordered logit or probit, but the qualitative results are the same in OLS and easier 
to display. Ordered logit or probit results are available on request. Collinearity is tested for in all regressions and the 
presented specifications are not problematic concerning this issue. 
7 Due to collinearity, we cannot include all measures. 
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be biased. Therefore, we also control for support in 2012 in model 2b. In May 2013, we 
control for the experienced outcomes. Models 3a and 3b follow the same structure for 
support in the output phase. For the sake of comparability, all regressions in table 7 are 
run on the subsample that responded to the questions in all three waves. 
From table 7 it is clear that input legitimacy is a highly important explanatory 
factor for support in the input phase. In the throughput phase, input legitimacy still 
plays a role, although throughput legitimacy is more important. In the output phase, just 
before the referendum, legitimacy in all phases matters to a significant degree, where 
output legitimacy plays the most important role. The expectations/realizations of policy 
outcomes matter in all phases. 
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Table 7. OLS Regressions for Support for the Congestion Tax 
 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
 May 2012 May 2013 May 2013 Sept. 2014 Sept. 2014 
      
Legitimacy (2012)A 0.529*** 0.643*** 0.182*** 0.465*** 0.126** 
 (0.0713) (0.0748) (0.0493) (0.0722) (0.0540) 
Change in legitimacy (2013–
12) 
 0.0997*** 0.129*** 0.0493 0.109*** 
  (0.0333) (0.0213) (0.0350) (0.0256) 
Change in legitimacy (2014–
13) 
   -0.0114 0.0713** 
    (0.0421) (0.0308) 
I will be worse off 
economically  
-0.397*** -0.372*** -0.105*** -0.341*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0163) (0.0219) (0.0172) 
Shorter travel time  0.368*** 0.236*** 0.0941*** 0.398*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0189) (0.0311) (0.0244) 
Congestion increases  -0.317*** -0.321*** -0.094*** -0.259*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0275) (0.0421) (0.0310) 
City’s economy improves  0.0548* 0.0801** 0.00455 0.182*** 0.0450** 
 (0.0315) (0.0327) (0.0209) (0.0307) (0.0229) 
Support 2012   0.736***  0.645*** 
   (0.0197)  (0.0223) 
Female 0.227** 0.268** 0.147** 0.194* 0.136* 
 (0.100) (0.106) (0.0680) (0.100) (0.0731) 
Age 2013 -0.0136*** -0.0198*** 0.00753**
* 
-0.0156*** -
0.00710*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00376) (0.00242) (0.00360) (0.00264) 
Education -0.0503 -0.0781* -0.0470* -0.0747* -0.0429 
 (0.0385) (0.0405) (0.0259) (0.0388) (0.0283) 
Gothenburg 0.350*** 0.442*** 0.0879 0.388*** 0.104 
 (0.0958) (0.100) (0.0647) (0.0959) (0.0706) 
Income -0.129** -0.0434 -0.0164 -0.0600 -0.0245 
 (0.0537) (0.0559) (0.0357) (0.0532) (0.0388) 
Constant 3.563*** 3.912*** 1.489*** 3.312*** 1.243** 
 (0.421) (0.445) (0.291) (0.435) (0.298) 
      
Number of observations 972 969 969 966 966 
R squared 0.593 0.568 0.824 0.603 0.789 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 A Instrumented by predicted value 
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Many of the variables included in the regressions in table 7 are significantly 
correlated,8 which makes the magnitudes of the coefficients somewhat unreliable. 
However, the qualitative results (i.e., signs) are valid. In order to reduce this potential 
endogeneity problem, we also present the results in difference terms in table 8. 
In table 8 we instead analyze changes in legitimacy and policy support throughout 
the political process and make use of samples as large as possible in each phase.9 In the 
input phase (model 1), we first regress legitimacy as proxied by perceived democracy in 
the political process on political distrust and political interest in addition to the 
socioeconomic control variables. The predicted values from this regression are then 
used to instrument legitimacy in the support regression presented in model 2, which is 
similar to the regression presented in model 1 in table 7. 
After the input phase, distrust in politicians may change as a consequence of the 
policy as indicated by the theoretical model. Hence, the difference in distrust for local 
politicians between May 2012 and May 2013 is regressed on the support for the 
congestion tax in May 2012. It is, moreover, likely that the effect on political distrust is 
not symmetric if one supports or objects to the congestion tax. In order to allow for 
different responses, we apply a kink design with possibly different slopes depending on 
support or objection to the congestion tax in 2012. After this regression is run (results 
presented in model 3), the predicted values are used as an explanatory variable for the 
change in legitimacy, which is shown in model 4. Also here we allow for potentially 
different effects depending on whether distrust increased or decreased. Change in 
support between 2012 and 2013 is displayed in model 5. Both change in legitimacy as 
such and reduced legitimacy are included on the right-hand side as are the differences 
between expected outcomes in May 2012 and perceived outcomes one year later. When 
we move on to the output phase just before the referendum (models 6–8), the procedure 
is the same. 
 
 
                                                     
8 See table A1 in the appendix for a correlation matrix. 
9 Table A2 in the appendix is a corresponding table for the subsample who participated in all three waves. The results 
are similar although less significant than those in table 8. 
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Table 8. Regressions of Differences in Legitimacy and Support, OLS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Legitimacy May 
2012 
Support May 
2012 
Change in 
Political Distrust 
May (2013–12) 
Change in 
Legitimacy May 
(2013–12) 
Change in 
Support May 
(2013–12) 
Change in 
Political Distrust 
Sept. (2014–May 
2013) 
Change in 
Legitimacy (Sept. 
2014–May 2013) 
Change in 
Support (Sept. 
2014–May 2013) 
         
Political distrust 2012 -0.691***        
Changed distrust A    -0.646***   -1.634***  
Increased distrustA    -0.233***   0.0247  
Legitimacy 2012B  0.160***       
Change legitimacy      0.144***   0.106*** 
Reduced legitimacy      -0.0554**   -0.0381 
Support last wave   -0.0295***   0.0381   
Objected last wave   0.0395**   0.0072   
Tax has neg. effect on 
personal economy  
 -0.233***       
My travel time will be 
shorter  
 0.151***      
 
 
Tax protects environment   0.519***       
Tax increases congestion   -0.114***       
City’s economy will 
improve  
 0.0216**       
Change personal economy.      -0.0776***   -0.0403** 
Change environment      0.190***   0.106*** 
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Change congestion      -0.0302***   -0.0193 
Change travel time      0.0689***   0.0270* 
Change city’s economy 
will improve  
    0.0200**   0.0224 
Political interest -0.214***   -0.0664*   -0.0242  
Income  -0.0522***   -0.0372***   0.00704 
Gothenburg 0.381*** 0.0666** 0.0609** 0.0185 -0.0462 0.139** 0.154 0.0362 
         
Observations 5,293 5,216 4,078 3,800 3,890 1,204 1,004 1,234 
R squared 0.178 0.718 0.013 0.024 0.171 0.013 0.023 0.049 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results are controlled for gender, age, and education. 
A The change in political distrust between the present and the previous period is instrumented by predicted values.  
B Input legitimacy is instrumented by predicted values. 
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From model 1 in table 8, it is clear that distrust of local politicians reduces input 
legitimacy, while a strong political interest increases it. In model 3, we see that the support for 
the congestion tax affects the change in distrust and that the effect is much stronger for those 
who object to the congestion tax than for those who support it.10 Exactly the same pattern is 
found in model 4, where legitimacy changes as a consequence of altered trust; changes in 
distrust have a significant effect on legitimacy, but the effect is stronger for increased distrust. 
Hence, throughput legitimacy is different from input legitimacy and can be explained by 
reduced trust for the local politicians, which in turn is explained by the objection to the policy, 
just as suggested in the theoretical model. Change in support between the input and 
throughput phases depends significantly on the change in legitimacy, especially if legitimacy 
was reduced between 2012 and 2013. Also changes in the expected policy outcomes are 
significant with expected signs. 
Models 6–8 in table 8 show the results of the output phase. Our analysis of the output 
phase is conducted like the throughput phase: we analyze whether the attitude toward the 
policy alters political trust. We find that the updated attitude toward the congestion tax has no 
effect on political distrust in this phase, but it seems like the political cost came together with 
policy implementation and there is no further change in political distrust that can be attributed 
to the policy attitude. The change in legitimacy, shown in model 7 can still be explained by 
altered distrust, but there is no longer any different impact from whether distrust has increased 
or decreased. Concerning policy support, the change between the throughput and the output 
phases depends on the change in legitimacy, but once again, it is the magnitude of change in, 
rather than the reduction of, legitimacy that significantly affect policy support. We can thus 
conclude that the strongest effect from policy support on legitimacy occurs between the input 
and throughput phases. Legitimacy in all phases also seems to matter for policy support, 
where the strongest effect comes from present phase legitimacy. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our main theoretical argument suggests that the policy process is dynamic, implying that the 
drivers of public policy support, and therefore support itself, are changing over the time, 
during which policy is being decided on and implemented. However, we also argue that 
                                                     
10 The congestion tax was initiated and first decided on by the local council but then also formally decided on by the central 
parliament. Interestingly, the corresponding regressions for the central government and the parliament show completely 
insignificant results. Thus, although both central and local politicians were involved in the decision, only the latter 
experienced a political cost in terms of reduced trust. 
26 
 
perceived legitimacy in the input phase may indeed have lingering effects that have an impact 
on support in the throughput and output phases. In order to test these hypotheses on the case 
of the Gothenburg congestion tax policy process, we conducted a set of operations enabling 
us to analyze how the antecedents of public support for the congestion tax varies across the 
input, throughput, and output phases, respectively. Doing so, we found that input legitimacy, 
i.e., institutional trust and positive perceptions of the decision-making processes and 
procedures, indeed is an important explanatory factor for policy support in the input phase. In 
addition, there are also lingering effects of input legitimacy on policy support in the 
subsequent throughput and output phases, although this effect is reduced as factors more 
readily connected to the more immediate phase become increasingly important. In addition, 
we found that perceptions of policy outcomes affect support in all three phases being studied, 
but they have slightly different effects as these perceptions change from mere expectations to 
actual experiences. 
Furthermore, change in support between the input and throughput phases depends 
significantly on change in legitimacy perceptions, and in our particular case this is especially 
so if legitimacy was reduced between 2012 and 2013. As predicted by theory, we also found 
that distrust of local politicians weakens perceptions of input legitimacy, while a strong 
political interest increases it. The initial level of support for the congestion tax affects 
subsequent changes in political trust with the effect being significantly stronger for those 
objecting to the congestion tax than for those supporting it. This pattern was also found when 
legitimacy changed as a consequence of altered trust; changes in political trust have a 
significant effect on legitimacy, but the effect is stronger for increased distrust. Hence, and as 
illustrated in figure 1, throughput legitimacy is different from input legitimacy and this can be 
explained by reduced trust in local politics, which in turn is explained by experiencing the 
implementation of a policy one initially objected to. 
Taken together, these results imply support for all our hypotheses because with the data 
we have used, we find that (1) legitimacy is a significant driver of policy support in all phases 
of the policy process, (2) the sources of legitimacy vary across these phases, (3) public policy 
support in one phase of the policy cycle is a function of legitimacy in both the present and the 
previous phases of the policy cycle, and (4) the relationship between pre- and post-
implementation legitimacy appear to be hierarchical as the importance of legitimacy in the 
present phase is more important than legitimacy in previous phases. 
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 6. Conclusions 
A range of political science research on policy feedback loops have demonstrated how public 
opinion changes as a result of policy implementation, following Schattschneider’s (1935) 
proposition that new policy is indeed conducive to new politics. However, to date the 
literature has mainly focused on the attitudinal effects of policy outputs or outcomes (e.g., 
Pierson 1993; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Soss 1999; Soss and Schram 2007), whereas the 
question of if, and the processes by which, policy attitudes change during the process of 
deciding on and implementing a policy, has been less explored. Apart from the theoretical 
relevance of better understanding these processes to grasp the dynamics of the public opinion-
public policy nexus, knowledge about the mechanisms of public opinion in this respect also 
pertains, empirically, to the overall effectiveness of and political possibilities to introduce 
various policy measures and to make political priorities. 
In this article we have used unique panel data to explore the process of changing policy 
attitudes in a policy-cycle perspective, tracing public policy support and its antecedents across 
two and a half years from initial political decision-making to the post-implementation period 
covering the input, throughput, and output phases of the policy process. Specifically, we 
demonstrate how public support for the introduction of a large-scale congestion tax in the 
Swedish city of Gothenburg is affected by changes in perceptions of legitimacy, pertaining 
both to the processes and procedures of decision-making and to the expectations and 
experience of substantial outcomes resulting from the congestion tax. Our analysis shows that 
although first impressions last, because legitimacy in the input phase retains significance for 
policy support in later phases, the sources of legitimacy and therefore of policy support also 
change during the policy process as new experiences, rather than expectations, of individuals 
and the collective come to the fore. Furthermore, our results suggest that the policy process 
indeed is dynamic and we show clear interactions between policy support and legitimacy that 
help us understand how policy attitudes develop. When aiming to better understand how and 
why public opinion changes as a result of policy implementation, attitudes in the output phase 
cannot be taken at face value. Rather, this dynamic relationship between political events and 
public policy support points to the significance of exploring the mechanisms behind policy 
attitudes in each phase of the policy cycle, as the perceptions of legitimacy that drive public 
policy support are not the same throughout the process from decision-making to 
implementation and policy evaluation. Attitudes of the policy and expectations of its effects in 
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one phase may very well affect the perceived legitimacy in future phases, which in turn 
affects future attitudes and so on. 
We have made a first attempt to thoroughly scrutinize the dynamics of the policy cycle 
by analyzing how perceptions of legitimacy, both toward the inputs to the policy process and 
its proposed outcomes, change over time to affect policy support in different phases. Through 
the use of panel data and a within-subjects design with 980 respondents, we have been able to 
follow the development of policy attitudes throughout the policy process and trace these 
developments to the changes in political trust, perceptions of decision-making procedures, as 
well as increasing experiences of policy outcomes. Although this approach reveals a great 
deal of the antecedents of public policy attitudes, and will be a way forward for future 
empirical research into the policy-opinion dynamic, further studies might focus on the 
political side of the story by more closely analyzing the specifics of the decision-making and 
implementation processes and how the debate surrounding new policy is played out in media 
and among political elites, potentially affecting both initial public attitudes and the 
retrospective formation of policy support. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Correlation Matrix for Variables in May 2012 
 Support Instrumented 
Legitimacy 
Tax Has 
Neg. Effect 
on 
Personal 
Economy 
Travel 
Time Will 
be Shorter 
Tax 
Increases 
Congestion 
City’s 
Economy 
Will 
Improve 
Support 1      
Instrumented 
legitimacy 
0.42 1     
Tax has neg. 
effect on 
personal 
economy 
-0.61 -0.30 1    
Travel time 
will be 
shorter 
-0.48 -0.28 0.34 1   
Tax 
increases 
congestion 
0.47 0.22 -0.28 -0.29 1  
City’s 
economy 
will improve 
0.16 0.12 -0.09 -0.12 0.08 1 
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Table A2. Regressions on Attitudes for the Subsample Who Took Part in all Three Phases of the Survey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Legitimacy 
(May 2012) 
Support (May 
2012) 
Change 
Political 
Distrust (May 
2012–2013) 
Change 
Legitimacy 
(May 2012–
2013) 
Change 
Support May 
(2012–2013) 
Change 
Political 
Distrust (May 
2013-Sept. 
2014) 
Change 
Legitimacy 
(May 2013 - 
Sept. 2014) 
Change 
Support–(May 
2013 - Sept. 
2014) 
         
Political distrust 2012 -0.814***        
Changed distrustA    -0.670   -1.321***  
Increased distrustA    -0.331***   -0.00164  
Legitimacy 2012B  0.164***       
Change legitimacy      0.133***   0.0957*** 
Reduced legitimacy      -0.0300   -0.0667 
Support last wave   0.0190   0.0358***   
Objected last wave   -0.300**   -0.068   
Tax has neg. effect on 
personal economy 2012 
 -0.229***       
My travel time will be 
shorter 2012 
 0.592***       
Tax protects 
environment 2012 
 -0.0561*       
Tax increases 
congestion 2012 
 0.155***       
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City’s economy will 
improve 2012 
 0.00497       
Change personal 
ec.onomy  
    -0.0561***   -0.0630*** 
Change environment      0.170***   0.0768*** 
Change congestion      -0.00365   -0.00166 
Change shorter travel 
time  
    0.0489***   0.0246 
Change city’s economy 
will improve  
    -0.000787   0.0177 
Political interest -0.137   -0.145**   -0.00939  
Income  0.0407   -0.0121   -0.00176 
Gothenburg 0.574*** 0.147** 0.0707 -0.0964 -0.0383 0.156** 0.126 0.0103 
         
Observations 975 971 976 975 960 976 921 962 
R squared 0.230 0.756 0.018 0.041 0.120 0.016 0.016 0.039 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All results are controlled for gender, age, and education. 
A The change in political distrust between the present and the previous periods is instrumented by predicted values. 
B Input legitimacy is instrumented by predicted values. 
